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3Umpires, Not Activists:
Th e Recent Jurisprudence 
of the Nebraska Supreme Court
Richard F. Duncan
I. Herein of Judges Who View 
Their Role as Umpires, Not Rulers
I love the “great and glorious game,” as Commissioner Bart Giamatti once described baseball. Because I am both a baseball fan and a law professor, Chief 
Justice John Roberts grabbed my attention when he 
compared the role of a judge to that of an umpire during 
his confi rmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee:
My personal appreciation that I owe a great debt to 
others reinforces my view that a certain humility should 
characterize the judicial role. Judges and Justices are 
servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges 
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they 
apply them. Th e role of an umpire and a judge is critical. 
Th ey make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is 
a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see 
the umpire.1
Of course, there is more than one kind of umpire, 
and Sen. John Cornyn was quick to pick up on this. 
Referring to a post he had read somewhere in the 
blogosphere, Sen. Cornyn recounted the “old story” 
about three diff erent kinds of umpires explaining their 
approach to calling the game:
First was the umpire that says, “Some are balls, and some 
are strikes, and I call them the way they are.”  Th e second 
umpire says, “Some are balls and some are strikes, and 
I call them the way I see them.” Th e third said, “Some 
are balls and some are strikes, but they ain’t nothing till 
I call them.”2
When asked which kind of umpire was his role model 
for serving as a judge, Roberts hit the pitch out of the 
park:
Well, I think I agree with your point about the danger 
of analogies in some situations. It’s not the last, because 
they are balls and strikes regardless, and if I call them one 
and they are the other, that doesn’t change what they are. 
It just means that I got it wrong. I guess I like the one 
in the middle because I do think there are right answers. 
I know that it’s fashionable in some places to suggest 
that there are no right answers and that the judges are 
motivated by a constellation of diff erent considerations, 
and because of that it should aff ect how we approach 
certain other issues. Th at’s not the view of the law that 
I subscribe to.
I think when you folks legislate, you do have 
something in mind in particular, and you put it into 
words, and you expect judges not to put in their own 
preference, not to substitute their judgment for you, but 
to implement your view of what you are accomplishing 
in that statute.
I think when the framers framed the Constitution it 
was the same thing, and the judges are not to put in their 
own personal views about what the Constitution should 
say, but they are supposed to interpret it and apply the 
meaning that is in the Constitution, and I think there 
is meaning there, and I think there is meaning in your 
legislation, and the job of a good judge is to do as good 
a job as possible to get the right answer.3 
Chief Justice Roberts has it exactly right. Th e 
proper role of a judge is to apply the law, not to make 
the law. For example, when deciding constitutional 
issues, judges “should confi ne themselves to enforcing 
norms that are stated or are clearly implicit in the 
written Constitution.”4 Th e judge who looks outside the 
written Constitution “always looks inside himself and 
nowhere else.”5 In short, judicial activism occurs when 
a judge substitutes his personal preferences for those 
contained in a written constitution or statute. As Roger 
Clegg has noted, judicial activism “can involve putting 
something into the text that isn’t there, or taking out 
something that is there.”6 Moreover, if a statute violates 
the Constitution, “it would be judicial activism not to 
strike it down.”7 Th e non-activist judge must follow the 
Constitution wherever it leads. Th e activist judge drags 
the Constitution wherever he wants it to go.
..........................................................................................
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When activist judges claim to be interpreting 
a living, breathing, evolving Constitution, they are 
being disingenuous with the American public. Th e 
Constitution does not evolve. Surely, the sudden 
appearance of new constitutional rules in the fossil 
record is best explained by a theory of intelligent design, 
of Creation if you please, by shifting majorities on the 
Supreme Court. For example, Erwin Chemerinsky 
observes that activists believe that “the meaning and 
application of constitutional provisions should evolve 
by interpretation.”8 “Evolving by interpretation” sure 
sounds like an account of Creation to me, especially 
in light of Chemerinsky’s acknowledgement that new 
constitutional rights, such as “a right to abortion,” can 
come into being by judicial decree regardless of “what 
the framers intended.”9
In other words, the basic distinction between an 
activist judge and a non-activist judge is the former 
follows the law only when it suits him to do so, while 
the latter follows the law even when it confl icts with 
his personal beliefs and policy preferences. As Judge 
Bork has said, the “moment of temptation” for a judge 
is when he realizes that the law does not embody his 
personal “political and moral imperative.”10 When faced 
with such a temptation, the non-activist judge must set 
aside his personal values and follow the rule of law. Th e 
activist judge, however, will submit to temptation and 
choose “to rule where a legislator should.”11 Reduced to 
its essence, the non-activist judge chooses the “American 
form of government”12 over his personal preferences, 
and the activist judge makes the opposite choice. Th us, 
it matters a great deal when we evaluate a court as 
“activist” or “non-activist.”
II. The Nebraska Supreme Court: 
Respecting the Rule of Law
For most of the period of this study, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has been occupied exclusively by judges 
appointed by Governor Ben Nelson, a Democrat 
who presently serves in the United States Senate.13 
Notwithstanding this single-party domination of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, the recent jurisprudence of 
the court has been marked by a strong and enduring 
respect for the rule of law and judicial restraint. 
Although there may be one or two minor blemishes 
on the court’s score card, my overall impression of this 
court is that it acts like an umpire that enforces the 
strike zone, as the strike zone is defi ned in the rulebook. 
Indeed, if the best umpires are those who go unnoticed 
because they do their job properly, then the Nebraska 
Supreme Court is a very good court indeed, because 
its quiet devotion to the rule of law rarely generates 
heated attention or controversy. In short, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court does what all courts should do—it 
follows the rule of law wherever it leads, with quiet 
dignity and humility.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint: 
Herein of Political Questions and Educational Funding
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court authored a textbook 
example of judicial restraint and deference to the 
constitutional prerogatives of the legislature in its 
seminal 2007 school funding case, Nebraska Coalition 
for Educational Equity v. Heineman.14 In Heineman, a 
Coalition of school districts and educational activists 
sued Governor Heineman to enjoin him from 
implementing Nebraska’s education funding system. 
Th e Coalition’s complaint alleged that the existing 
funding system was unconstitutional because it 
provided inadequate funding for K-12 public education 
in violation of the religious freedom and free instruction 
clauses of the Nebraska Constitution.15 
Both of these constitutional provisions are 
directed to the Nebraska Legislature. Th e religious 
freedom clause provides in relevant part: “Religion, 
morality, and knowledge…being essential to good 
government, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to 
pass suitable laws…to encourage schools and the means 
of instruction.”16 Th e free instruction clause provides: 
“Th e Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in 
the common schools of this state of all persons between 
the ages of fi ve and twenty-one years.”17
Th e Coalition asked the court to decree that the 
religious freedom and free instruction clauses create a 
“fundamental right” to an “adequate education”18 and 
to enjoin the existing education funding system as 
unconstitutional, because it does not provide “adequate 
resources” to satisfy the demands of this new and 
expensive constitutional right.19
In an opinion that should satisfy even the hardest-
to-please friend of judicial restraint, a unanimous 
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Coalition’s 
5claims “present nonjusticiable political questions” 
because the “Nebraska Constitution commits the issue 
of providing free instruction to the Legislature and 
fails to provide judicially discernible and manageable 
standards for determining what level of public education 
the Legislature must provide.”20 In other words, defi ning 
and funding an adequate level of education in the 
public schools of Nebraska is a matter of policy for the 
Legislature to decide, not a legal question to be decreed 
by an unelected judiciary.
Moreover, the court’s reasoning in Heineman 
was absolutely fi rst rate. Th e court began by stating 
that the distribution of powers clause of the Nebraska 
Constitution21 “prohibits one branch of government 
from exercising the duties of another branch.”22 Th is 
constitutional principle of separation of powers thus 
precludes the courts from deciding issues committed by 
the Nebraska Constitution to another branch of state 
government23 and enjoins the judiciary from reviewing 
the wisdom of decisions of the Legislature.24 In the 
words of the Nebraska Supreme Court: “Th at restraint 
refl ects the reluctance of the judiciary to set policy 
in areas constitutionally reserved to the Legislature’s 
plenary power.”25
Th e court’s opinion was also faithful to the will 
of the People of Nebraska and the state’s history and 
traditions:
Nebraska’s constitutional history shows that the people 
of Nebraska have repeatedly left school funding decisions 
to the Legislature’s discretion. Even more illuminating, 
the people rejected a recent amendment that would have 
imposed qualitative standards on the Legislature’s duty 
to provide public education.26
In short, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that 
the delicate balancing of competing policy choices 
and political interests concerning school funding 
was “beyond [the] ken”27 of the judiciary and thus 
constitutes a nonjusticiable political question. Th e 
court’s characterization of its holding is full of the kind 
of wisdom that is so hard to fi nd in modern judicial 
opinions: “Th e landscape is littered with courts that 
have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of 
continuous litigation and challenges to their states’ 
school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse 
to wade into that Stygian swamp.”28
In a world in which judicial activism has become 
the norm in many jurisdictions, this opinion of the 
Nebraska Supreme Court is a balm for the soul, a 
refreshing refl ection of the court’s humble restraint and 
respect for the political process.
Interestingly, as this Report was about to go to 
press, the Nebraska Supreme Court decided another 
important education case. In Citizens of Decatur for 
Equal Education v. Lyons-Decatur School District,29 
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the Nebraska 
Constitution does not provide a “fundamental right 
to equal and adequate funding of schools.”30 The 
court applied a deferential rational basis test to the 
school board’s actions, and held that the school board’s 
decision to reallocate resources within the school district 
was “rationally related to its legitimate goal of providing 
an education to all children in the district.”31
Upholding Term Limits and the Will of the People: 
Herein of the Framer’s Intent and Original 
Understanding
In State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale,32 a coalition of 
voters and incumbent legislators brought a mandamus 
and declaratory judgment action challenging the 
constitutionality of the term limits provision of the 
Nebraska Constitution. Th is provision, which was 
added to the constitution when the People of Nebraska 
voted to approve Initiative 415 in November of 2000,33 
provides:
(1) No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of 
the Legislature for four years next after the expiration 
of two consecutive terms regardless of the district 
represented.
(2) Service prior to January 1, 2001, as a member of 
the Legislature shall not be counted for the purpose of 
calculating consecutive terms in subsection (1) of this 
section.
(3) For the purpose of this section, service in offi  ce for 
more than one-half of a term shall be deemed service 
for a term.34
Th e coalition challenged the constitutionality of 
the term limits provision under the U.S. Constitution, 
because, they argued, it violates the Free Speech and 
Equal Protection Clauses. Th e Nebraska Supreme 
Court unanimously denied these claims, and, in 
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the process, demonstrated its sincere and enduring 
commitment to original understanding and the will 
of the people.
The coalition’s claims depended upon a 
particular reading of the term limits amendment, an 
interpretation that read the provision as disqualifying 
any legislator “after he or she has served more than 
half of a second 4-year term.”35 In other words, the 
plaintiff s interpreted the term limits provision as 
disqualifying legislators from completing their second 
terms in offi  ce and requiring “political appointees 
to complete the second term of any incumbent 
representative.”36
Although this was a possible reading of the 
term limits amendment, it is a reading that would 
render the law absurd and possibly unconstitutional. 
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court rejected this strained 
reading of the amendment, and in the process 
observed that its duty was to obey “the supreme 
written will of the people regarding the framework 
for their government.”37
The court’s opinion authored a textbook 
for a jurisprudence of original understanding. 
According to the Nebraska Supreme Court: (1) 
“[i]t is the duty of courts to ascertain and to carry 
into eff ect the intent and purpose of the framers of 
the Constitution;”38 (2) constitutional provisions 
“must be interpreted and understood in their most 
natural and obvious meaning;”39 and (3) the court 
should give eff ect to the “meaning that obviously 
would be accepted and understood by laypersons.”40
Moreover, the Nebraska Constitution “must be read 
as a whole” and, thus, an amendment “becomes an 
integral part of the instrument and must be construed 
and harmonized, if possible, with all other provisions 
so as to give eff ect to every section and clause as well 
as to the whole instrument.”41 It is hard to argue 
with the court’s learned treatise on constitutional 
interpretation.
Having set sail on a course of original 
understanding, the destination the Nebraska Supreme 
Court reached seems obviously correct—the “plain 
and obvious meaning” of the term limits provision 
does not require incumbents to be disqualified 
before completing their second term. Th erefore, the 
provision must be upheld, because it does not violate 
the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.42
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent originalist 
opinion in Gale upholding the term limits initiative 
stands in marked contrast to two decisions the court 
rendered in the 1990s striking down term limits 
provisions adopted by the people. In the fi rst of these 
earlier decisions, Duggan v. Beerman,43 the court 
declared void a term limits initiative adopted by a vote 
of the people of Nebraska. Th e issue in the case was 
whether the initiative had been validly invoked by a 
petition signed by a suffi  cient number of registered 
voters.
Although some critics charge that the court ignored 
the plain meaning of the Nebraska Constitution by 
increasing the number of signatures required to invoke 
an initiative, the case is not that simple. Th e problem is 
that Article III, Section 2 of the Nebraska Constitution 
had been amended in 1988, and this amendment caused 
some tension with Article III, Section 4, concerning the 
proper manner of calculating the required number of 
signatures to place an initiative on the ballot. Th e two 
confl icting provisions are as follows.
Section 2 provides:
Th e fi rst power reserved by the people is the initiative 
whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional 
amendments adopted by the people independently of 
the Legislature. Th is power may be invoked by petition 
wherein the proposed measure shall be set forth at 
length. If the petition be for the enactment of a law, it 
shall be signed by seven percent of the registered voters 
of the state, and if the petition be for the amendment of 
the Constitution, the petition therefor shall be signed 
by ten percent of such registered voters. In all cases 
the registered voters signing such petition shall be so 
distributed as to include fi ve percent of the registered 
voters of each of two-fi fths of the counties of the state, 
and when thus signed, the petition shall be fi led with 
the Secretary of State who shall submit the measure 
thus proposed to the electors of the state at the fi rst 
general election held not less than four months after 
such petition shall have been fi led…. (emphasis added).
Section 4, however, provides: 
The whole number of votes cast for Governor at the 
general election next preceding the fi ling of an initiative 
7or referendum petition shall be the basis on which the 
number of signatures to such petition shall be computed 
(emphasis added).
Th e problem for the court in Duggan was which 
of these two clear but inconsistent provisions for 
calculating the required number of signatures to invoke 
an initiative should the court follow. If it followed 
the former—based upon the number of registered 
voters—it would eff ectively increase the number of 
signatures required by a petition drive, because there 
are more registered voters than voters who actually cast 
votes at gubernatorial elections.
Th e court held that “when constitutional provisions 
are in confl ict, the later amendment controls. Th us, 
article III, § 2, which refers to registered voters, repeals 
the reference in article III, §4, which refers to those 
voting in the preceding gubernatorial election.”44 As a 
result, the court concluded that the term limits initiative 
was not invoked by a suffi  cient number of registered 
voters and it was therefore void despite being adopted 
by a vote of the people.45 
The second controversial term limits decision 
from the 1990s, involving the same parties as the case 
just discussed and therefore also known as Duggan v. 
Beerman46 (or, as I will label it, Duggan II), concerned 
Initiative 408, which sought to impose “term limits on 
a variety of federal and state elective offi  ces.”47 Although 
Initiative 408 was overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 
the people on November 8, 1994, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court was obliged to follow a decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States invalidating “state-imposed 
term limits upon congressional offi  ces.”48 Although the 
Nebraska Supreme Court cannot be faulted for following 
a binding precedent of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, its decision in Duggan II has been criticized for 
the court’s decision to refuse to sever the state term 
limits provisions from the federal term limits provisions 
despite the fact that Initiative 408 contained an explicit 
severability clause. As a result, the court held that the 
state term limits provisions were “so intertwined” with 
the unconstitutional federal provisions “that they, too, 
must be declared void.”49 Th e court’s 2007 decision in 
Gale upholding the current term limits provision is thus 
redemptive as well as originalist.
Same-sex Marriage and Adoption: 
Herein of Activism by the People 
and Restraint by the Court
In November 2000, the People of Nebraska voted 
overwhelmingly in support of Initiative 416, which 
added the following provision concerning marriage as 
Article I, § 29 of the Nebraska Constitution:
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be 
valid or recognized in Nebraska. Th e uniting of two 
persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic 
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall 
not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.
Th is provision, of course, was designed to ensure that 
the institution of marriage in Nebraska would never be 
transformed by an activist court, or even by a future 
majority in the Legislature. Although the Nebraska 
Marriage Amendment was declared unconstitutional 
by an activist federal district judge, its constitutionality 
was fi rmly established by a unanimous court of appeals 
in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning.50 Th is ruling, 
which is now the governing rule in the Eighth Circuit, 
made clear that “a state statute or constitutional provision 
codifying the traditional defi nition of marriage” serves 
“legitimate state interests” and “therefore do[es] not 
violate the Constitution of the United States.”51
In In re Adoption of Luke,52 the Nebraska Supreme 
Court was asked to decide whether the Nebraska 
adoption statutes permit one unmarried person to 
adopt the biological child of her partner without the 
latter relinquishing her parental rights. Although the 
issue presented by the case was broader than the issue of 
adoption by same-sex couples, the facts of In re Adoption 
of Luke involved a same-sex couple. 
Th e biological mother of Luke, a woman identifi ed 
only as B.P., conceived the child “by artifi cial semination 
using semen from an anonymous donor.”53 B.P.’s 
unmarried partner, a woman identifi ed only as A.E., 
wished to adopt Luke. As such, B.P. and A.E. fi led a 
petition “in which A.E. sought to adopt Luke [and] 
B.P. indicated her ‘consent.’”54 B.P. did not relinquish 
her parental rights to Luke, but instead sought only to 
add A.E. as a second “parent” of the child.
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court carefully parsed 
and faithfully interpreted the Nebraska adoption 
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statutes and held that “[w]ith the exception of a 
stepparent adoption which is explicitly provided for 
in the Nebraska adoption statutes and for which no 
relinquishment is required,” a child is not eligible for 
adoption unless the biological parents’ rights have been 
terminated or relinquished.55 As a result, the paramour 
of an unmarried parent may not adopt the parent’s child 
and raise him or her as a co-parent.
Again, this case is signifi cant because the Nebraska 
Supreme Court resisted all appeals to give the adoption 
statutes “a liberal rather than a strict construction,”56 
and instead chose to follow the rule of law and “the 
plain terms and manner of procedure of the Nebraska 
adoption statutes.”57
Respecting the Reserved Powers of the People: 
Herein of Judicial Restraint and Citizen Petitions
Under the Nebraska Constitution, the fi rst two 
powers retained by the People are the initiative58 and 
the referendum.59 Th ese powers give the People of 
Nebraska the fundamental right to take the reins of 
government away from the Legislature and the courts by 
placing important issues directly before the electorate. 
Th e initiative and referendum powers are perhaps the 
most important democratic liberties of a free people, 
and Nebraskans are very jealous about protecting these 
retained powers from those who are uncomfortable 
with the idea that “[h]ere the people rule.”60 Two recent 
decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrate 
the court’s enduring commitment to the Nebraska 
Constitution and the initiative and referendum.
In State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore61, the issue 
concerned the power of the Legislature to facilitate or to 
restrict the initiative or referendum powers. Under the 
Nebraska Constitution, the initiative and referendum 
powers are “invoked” by a petition signed by a particular 
percentage of registered voters. For example, when the 
initiative power is invoked to propose an amendment 
to the Nebraska Constitution, the petition must be 
signed by ten percent of the registered voters of the 
state.62 Th e Nebraska Secretary of State, who serves 
as the chief election offi  cer of the state, is responsible 
for verifying signatures on the petition before placing 
the proposed initiative on the ballot. Moreover, the 
Nebraska Constitution provides that “[t]he provisions 
with respect to the initiative and referendum shall be 
self-executing, but legislation may be enacted to facilitate 
their operation.”63 
Th e Moore case concerned an enactment of the 
Nebraska Legislature modifying the process for verifying 
signatures on petitions. Th e previous law had provided 
in pertinent part:
All signatures and addresses shall be presumed to be valid 
signatures and addresses if the election commissioner 
or county clerk has found the signers to be registered 
voters on or before the date on which the petition was 
required to be fi led with the Secretary of State, except 
that such presumption shall not be conclusive and may 
be rebutted by any credible evidence which the election 
commissioner or county clerk fi nds suffi  cient.64
However, in 1995, the Nebraska Legislature amended 
the law by providing that “[t]he signature, date of 
birth, and address shall be presumed to be valid only 
if the election commissioner or county clerk fi nds the 
printed name, date of birth, street and number or voting 
precinct, and city, village or post offi  ce address to match 
the registration records.”65 Th e Nebraska Attorney 
General brought a declaratory judgment action to 
declare the amended statute facially unconstitutional 
“because it does not act to facilitate the operation of 
the initiative process.”66 In other words, by requiring an 
“exact match” between the information contained on 
the petition and the voter registration records67 the law 
was hampering--not facilitating--the initiative power 
and was therefore unconstitutional.
The Nebraska Supreme Court accepted the 
Attorney General’s argument and declared the law 
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court issued a 
powerful opinion affi  rming the initiative as “precious 
to the people” and as a power “which the courts are 
zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit 
as well as letter.”68 Th us, “legislation which hampers or 
renders ineff ective the power reserved to the people is 
unconstitutional.”69
Sometimes originalism and judicial restraint 
remind me of castor oil—they are good for you even 
when they taste awful. As Judge Bork, might say, you 
must set aside the temptation to impose your own moral 
and ideological preferences, and follow the rule of law, 
even when the rule of law produces distasteful results.
For me, such a moment of temptation is 
exemplifi ed by the Nebraska Supreme Court’s originalist 
9jurisprudence in Pony Lake School District v. State 
Committee for Reorganization of School Districts.70 Even 
though I dislike the results, I have to admit that the 
Court was loyal to the rule of law.
Pony Lake concerned L.B. 126, which was passed 
over the Governor’s veto on June 3, 2005 and which 
required the dissolution of Class I school districts by 
June 15, 2006.71 Following passage of L.B. 126, a group 
of citizens sponsored a referendum designed to save 
Class I schools by referring L.B. 126 to the Nebraska 
electorate for approval or rejection.72 Although the 
sponsors obtained a sufficient percentage of valid 
signatures to get the referendum on the ballot (7.7 
percent), they fell short of obtaining the signatures 
of 10 percent of registered voters required to suspend 
the operation of L.B. 126 pending the outcome of the 
election.73 In other words, the Class I schools would be 
eliminated before the general election, and thus before 
the voters would have an opportunity to reject the law 
requiring their dissolution.
Th e basic issue for the Nebraska Supreme Court 
was whether L.B. 126 was unconstitutional because 
it “impermissibly burdened the people’s right of 
referendum.”74 This issue turned on the Court’s 
reading of the referendum provisions of the Nebraska 
Constitution.
Th e two governing constitutional provisions are 
Nebraska Constitution Article III, sections 3 and 4. Th e 
former sets forth “the number of signatures required 
to invoke the power to place a referendum measure on 
the ballot and the number of signatures required to 
simultaneously invoke the power to suspend an act’s 
operation until approved by voters.”75 Th e latter “sets 
forth the number of votes required to enact a ballot 
petition.”76
Section 3 provides that petitions invoking a 
referendum must be “signed by not less than fi ve percent 
of the registered voters of the state;” however, it requires 
the petition to be signed by “ten percent of the registered 
voters of the state” to suspend the challenged law “from 
taking eff ect” until the petition has been submitted to 
“the electors of the state.”
Section 4 provides in pertinent part:
A measure initiated shall become a law or part of the 
Constitution, as the case may be, when a majority of the 
votes cast thereon, and not less than thirty-fi ve per cent 
of the total vote cast at the election at which the same 
was submitted, are cast in favor thereof, and shall take 
eff ect upon proclamation by the Governor which shall 
be made within ten days after the offi  cial canvas of such 
votes…. Th e provisions with respect to the initiative and 
referendum shall be self-executing, but legislation may 
be enacted to facilitate their operation.
Th e plaintiff s argued that L.B. 126 was unconstitutional 
because its eff ective date impermissibly burdened the 
eff ectiveness of the referendum.77
In eff ect, the plaintiff s were asking the Nebraska 
Supreme Court to refuse to give eff ect to the express 
language of Section 3 concerning the percentage 
of signatures required on the petition to suspend a 
challenged law. Th e Court declined this invitation to 
ignore an express constitutional process and held that 
“because plaintiff s have failed to obtain the necessary 
number of signatures that would suspend the operation 
of L.B. 126 pending a referendum election, they have 
received exactly the right reserved” by the Nebraska 
Constitution.78 As the Court observed, the Nebraska 
Constitution represents “the supreme written will 
of the people” and when its language is clear and 
unambiguous, “it is not for [t]his court to read into it 
that which is not there.”79 Th e rule of law governs in 
Nebraska, even when we wish it said something else!
One or Two Areas of Minor Concern: 
Herein of Capital Punishment and Employment Law
Capital punishment and employment law are 
very much outside my area of expertise, but before 
concluding this report I will briefl y discuss a few of 
the Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent decisions in these 
areas. Although I do not classify these decisions as 
constituting “judicial activism,” they may be of concern 
to some and perhaps justify a watchful vigilance on the 
part of the Nebraska citizenry.
Perhaps the Nebraska Supreme Court case 
generating the most concern among proponents of 
judicial restraint is State v. Moore.80 In Moore, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court—on its own motion—
“reconsidered its order for the issuance of a death 
warrant” for a convicted murderer.81 Remarkably, the 
court acted on its own even though Moore had not 
requested a stay of execution.82 Th e court followed 
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the principle that “death is diff erent”83 and stayed 
Moore’s execution because another case was pending 
on the court’s docket in which the court was asked to 
determine whether, under recent decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, death by electrocution is “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”84 As Justice Gerrard said his in 
majority opinion, “Although we respect the defendant’s 
autonomy, the solemn business of executing a human 
being cannot be subordinated to the caprice of the 
accused.”85 
Chief Justice Heavican issued a powerful dissent 
to the court’s “unprecedented”86 action, and stated 
that “Moore’s statements and lack of action show 
that he has elected to waive his right to challenge the 
State’s protocol.”87 His point is well-taken, but so is 
the majority’s point that “should Nebraska’s mode of 
execution be found lawful [in the pending litigation], 
the State’s interest in executing Moore’s sentence would 
only have been delayed.”88 Personally, I am in equipoise 
about this case. Perhaps it is an example of judicial 
activism, but if this is all we have to worry about in the 
Cornhusker State, we are very fortunate indeed.
Finally, this Report will briefly consider the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s recent decisions recognizing 
a public policy exception to the “at will employment 
doctrine” that has traditionally been the “clear rule” 
in Nebraska.89 In Jackson v. Morris Communications 
Corp.,90 the issue before the Nebraska Supreme Court 
was whether to recognize “a public policy exception 
to the at-will employment doctrine… for retaliatory 
discharge when an employee is fi red for fi ling a workers’ 
compensation claim.”91 Although the at-will doctrine 
generally permits an employer to discharge an employee 
“at any time with or without reason,”92 the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has for some time recognized a public 
policy exception that permits “an employee to claim 
damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation 
for the fi ring contravenes public policy.”93 Although 
the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act does not 
contain a specifi c provision prohibiting an employer 
from discharging an employee for fi ling a claim under 
the Act,94 the court decided to give the Act a “liberal 
construction” to carry out its “benefi cent purpose” 
and held that it “presents a clear mandate” for judicial 
protection of employees discharged for fi ling a workers’ 
compensation claim.95 Maybe this is activism, but 
maybe the court was simply trying to give full eff ect 
to employment legislation enacted by the Nebraska 
Legislature.
Perhaps of more concern to some is the Nebraska 
Supreme Court’s recent decision, in Trosper v. Bag 
‘N Save,96 to extend the holding in Jackson to cover 
retaliatory demotion in addition to retaliatory discharge. 
As the court explained:
An employee’s right to be free from retaliatory demotion 
for fi ling a worker’s compensation claim is married to 
the right to be free from discharge. Demotion, like 
termination, coercively aff ects an employee’s exercise 
of his or her rights under the Nebraska Workers’ 
Compensation Act…. To promote such behavior would 
compromise the act and would render illusory the cause 
of action for retaliatory discharge.97
Justice Stephan, who was joined by Chief Justice 
Heavican, dissented on the theory that the majority 
had transformed “a narrow exception to the rule of 
nonliability for discharge into a new theory of liability 
for retaliatory demotion.”98 Although I personally might 
disagree with the court’s new employment law doctrine, 
I am reluctant to shout “activism” merely because the 
Nebraska Supreme Court reasonably chose to come out 
the other way. 
Stop the Presses! 
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court 
“Evolves” on Death By Electrocution
As this paper was going to press, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court decided State v. Mata99, a decision in 
which the “Nelson Six”100 all voted to declare execution 
by electrocution unconstitutional under the Nebraska 
Constitution. Although I have given the Nebraska 
Supreme Court high marks so far for being a non-
activist court, Mata is an activist decision. On a scale of 
1 to 10, with 1 being non-activist, 10 being extremely 
activist (and 12 being Justice Blackmun’s decree creating 
the abortion liberty in Roe v. Wade), I rate Mata as 
somewhere between a 6 and a 7.
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court marshalled all the 
usual clichés of activism in its opinion in Mata. Th e 
Court repeatedly embraced “evolving standards of 
decency,”101 “changing societal values,”102 the “instincts 
of civilized man,”103 and a “fl exible and dynamic”104 
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interpretation of the constitutional text in the course 
of its 69-page discourse on what constitutes “cruel and 
unusual punishment” under Nebraska Constitution 
Article I, Section 9.105 It was also careful to assert the 
activist banality that “[t]he prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment is not a static concept.”106  As 
Chief Justice Heavican, the sole Republican appointee 
on the court, was wise to point out in his thoughtful 
dissent, the problem with the majority’s evolutionary 
approach to the task of constitutional interpretation 
“is that it inherently tempts judges to inject their own 
subjective values into the constitutional analysis” and 
risks judges ruling where legislatures should.107 As 
Robert Bork has expressed it so eloquently, although 
“[t]o give in to temptation, this one time, solves an 
urgent human problem,” it also creates “a faint crack...
in the American foundation. A judge has begun to 
rule where a legislator should.”108 In other words, new 
constitutional rules do not evolve by natural processes; 
they are created based upon the subjective preferences 
of unelected judges.
Th e facts of Mata make the court’s activism all 
the more diffi  cult to bear. Raymond Mata, Jr. was 
convicted of a particularly cruel and gruesome murder 
of a child, 3-year old Adam Gomez.109 Not only did 
Mata murder the young boy, he dismembered him, 
mutilated him and “relished” the murder.110 The 
sentencing panel found that all this “gratuitous violence 
and unnecessary mutilation” was done for the purpose 
of punishing “Adam’s mother because [Mata] believed 
she was pushing him out of her life in favor of Adam’s 
father.”111 If ever a murderer deserved to be executed, 
surely Raymond Mata, Jr. is such a man.
Th e Nebraska Supreme Court was quite clear about 
a number of issues in the Mata decision. First, the 
Court made clear that it was not declaring electrocution 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, “because the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held otherwise.”112 Instead, the Court chose 
to decide the issue under the state constitution, and to 
look to federal caselaw only for “guidance.”113 Moreover, 
since the Nebraska Court believed that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions were based upon factual assumptions 
that were no longer reliable, the Court made clear 
that in interpreting the Nebraska Constitution’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, it would 
evaluate the issue in light of “contemporary human 
knowledge.”114 Regrettably, the Court did not even 
attempt to consult the original understanding of the 
Nebraska “cruel and unusual punishment” provision to 
determine if it was compatible with evolving standards 
of decency and contemporary knowledge about death 
by electrocution.
According to the court, new knowledge about 
electrocution supported its conclusion “that electrocution 
is unnecessarily cruel in its purposeless infl iction of 
physical violence and mutilation of the prisoner’s 
body.”115 Moreover, “[e]lectrocution’s proven history of 
burning and charring bodies is inconsistent with both 
the concepts of evolving standards of decency and the 
dignity of man,” and thus “violates the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment in Neb. Const. 
art. I, §9.”116 Th e court stayed Mata’s death sentence, 
because its decision left the State of Nebraska “without 
a constitutionally acceptable method of execution.”117
As Chief Justice Heavican observed, when the 
Nebraska Supreme Court treats the leading U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent upholding the constitutionality of 
electrocution as “an anachronism”118 and relies instead 
on purely subjective factors such as evolving standards 
of decency and the instincts of civilized man as the 
basis for its decision, one does not need to be Sherlock 
Holmes to deduce that judicial activism is at work and 
it is likely to produce “adverse consequences in future 
cases.”119 As Chief Justice Heavican warned:
[T]he majority chooses to essentially retain the Eighth 
Amendment’s prescriptions but avoids the problem 
of having to overrule a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
by purporting to reach its result under the Nebraska 
Constitution.
While this approach may serve the majority’s purpose, 
I believe it does so at the expense of clarity in our 
constitutional doctrine. Before today’s decision, lower 
courts could rest with confi dence on the belief that our 
constitution requires nothing more than the Eighth 
Amendment with regard to methods of punishment. 
By reaching a conclusion that contradicts U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent, this decision will give lower courts 
reason to question that belief. At a minimum, attorneys 
may exploit the ambiguity in today’s decision in 
subsequent cases.120
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Th e people of Nebraska need to be very vigilant in the 
post-Mata world to ensure that the Nebraska Supreme 
Court does not continue its slide down the slope of 
judicial activisim. Indeed, Mata is reminiscent of the 
court’s activism during the 1990s, when it refused to 
accept the statutory defi nition of second degree murder 
and, as a result, overturned every second degree murder 
conviction in the state.121 
CONCLUSION
Nebraska is the “Big Red” state, both in football 
and in politics. Th e people of Nebraska are conservative 
and they wish to rule themselves, either directly through 
the retained powers of initiative and referendum, or 
indirectly through the process of self-government 
and laws enacted by their democratically-elected 
representatives. Government by the judiciary is simply 
not the way we do things in Nebraska.
Th e people of Nebraska are fortunate to have a 
state Supreme Court so much in tune with the will of 
the people. As this Report has shown, recent decisions 
of the Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrate that the 
court, like a good umpire, is strongly committed to 
applying the law as written and to following the rule of 
law wherever it leads. Th e court understands that there 
are right answers and wrong answers when interpreting 
a written constitution or statutory enactment, and it 
is committed to fi nding the right answer even when 
it disagrees with the wisdom of the law or the policy 
choices refl ected in the law.
Moreover, not only does the Nebraska Supreme 
Court strive to faithfully follow the rule of law, its 
opinions often reveal a deep understanding of the proper 
role of the judiciary in a free and democratic society. 
Th e court has eloquently expressed its commitment to 
the constitutional process of separation of powers and 
the limited role of the judiciary “to set policy in areas 
constitutionally reserved to the legislature’s plenary 
power.”122 It has written what amounts to a learned 
treatise on a court’s sacred duty to “carry into eff ect the 
intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution” 
by interpreting the Nebraska Constitution in accordance 
with its “most natural and obvious meaning” and in light 
of the “meaning that obviously would be accepted and 
understood by laypersons.”123 Th e Nebraska Supreme 
Court has also recently and powerfully expressed its 
“zealous” commitment to protecting the reserved 
power of the people of Nebraska to amend the state 
constitution directly through the initiative process.124 
The Court has also made clear that the Nebraska 
Constitution expresses “the supreme written will of the 
people” and thus it is inappropriate for the court “to 
read into it that which is not there.”125
Although there may be a few decisions of the 
court that may give pause to some and justify watchful 
vigilance by the people of the state126—and there is 
reason to be particularly concerned about the court’s 
recent decision in Mata declaring death-by-electrocution 
unconstitutional—on balance it is this reporter’s 
conclusion that the people of Nebraska have a court 
we can be proud of, a court that is committed (most 
of the time) to judicial restraint and a jurisprudence 
of originalism. In short, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
understands that, like a good umpire, its job is not to 
make the rules, but rather to make sure “that everybody 
plays by the rules.” 
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